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A CRUSADE OVER THE AIRWAVES: THE BLUE
DIVISION ON RADIO NACIONAL DE ESPAÑA
(1941–1954)
Salvador Gómez García and Juan Martín
Quevedo
The Blue Division, Spain’s most notable military contribution to the Second World
War, has been examined from many different perspectives, though the role of
communication has not featured among them. This study aims to analyse the role
played by Spanish state radio in the creation and maintenance of Spain’s war effort
in that period. In order to achieve this, we used documentary sources, and more
specifically, reconstructed the radio programming schedules, mainly using the press,
due to the lack of audio recordings from the era. Finally, this work explores the
role of radio from the Blue Division’s inception through to its official disbandment;
or, put another way, the transition from commitment to the Axis powers to gradual
estrangement from them. A dual transition process occurred on Radio Nacional de
España: firstly, from zealous glorification to the silencing of the divisionaries by
official order. The second transition was from a radio station that, since the Civil
War, had lost its persuasive power, to a new perception of propaganda based on
the familiar and the emotional.
Radio Nacional and the impact of the Second World War in Spain
Spain’s foreign policy during the Second World War had two clear phases of
development. The first phase, while Ramón Serrano Súñer was Minister of Foreign
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Affairs, was characterised by neutrality, as proclaimed by Franco on 4 September
1939, albeit with pro-Axis sympathies which were overtly expressed. After Italy
entered the war, this position changed to become even more pro-German in nat-
ure, with a move to ‘non-belligerency’ from 12 June 1940 onwards. Despite the
political pressure from Hitler in his interview with Franco in Hendaya, Spain did
not join the fray, at least not officially. However, when the Third Reich attacked
the USSR in June 1941, the Spanish government decided to send a division of vol-
unteers to fight communism: the so-called División Azul, or Blue Division, which
fought on the Leningrad front.1
The second phase, which consisted in an increasing estrangement from the
Axis, started on 3 September 1942. Francisco Gómez Jordana, a notorius pro-
Allies politician, became the Minister of Foreign Affairs. During his term, Spain’s
official stand was, once again, neutrality. The cooling of diplomatic relations with
Germany – at least, in the public sphere – became increasingly more obvious as
the Wehrmacht experienced more difficulties in the war in the East. In October
1943, Franco decided to repatriate the Blue Division. Nevertheless, several thou-
sand Spanish volunteers disobeyed the order and chose to remain in the war, this
time as part of the German army.
In this context of assertion and exaltation of Hispano-German relations, the
German attack on the Soviet Union took place on 22 June 1941, without a prior
declaration of war. Two days later, Spain’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ramón Ser-
rano Súñer, took advantage of these circumstances to give an anti-Soviet speech at
a spontaneous rally in the Falange’s Madrid headquarters. Serrano’s address was
broadcast on all of Radio Nacional de España’s (hereinafter, ‘RNE’) stations and
published in the newspapers linked to the Falange.2 This ‘spontaneous’ manoeuvre
had, in fact, been planned. Two days earlier, the Germans had approved the dis-
patch of volunteers to the Russian front, and Franco had not opposed the initia-
tive.3 The state propaganda machine orchestrated a campaign to support the
formation of this ‘volunteer squadron’.4 As Franco saw it, this initiative did not
break Spain’s neutrality, since it was presented as a crusade against Communism
and not as a general military intervention, and certainly not as an intervention by
the Spanish state.5
In this campaign, broadcasters, and RNE in particular, played a leading role in
promoting the Spanish Volunteers’ Division, popularly known as The Blue Division.6
RNE had a series of advantages over other media. Firstly, it could achieve greater
social penetration, given its capacity to reach a population that was excluded from
the press by illiteracy and poverty, even in the larger cities. Furthermore, radio
also had a greater capacity for immediate mobilisation than the press or cinema,
particularly as the first NO-DOs did not come about until January 1943.7 The his-
tory of radio in Spain reinforced this perception. RNE was founded in January
1937 with the collaboration of Nazi Germany, and marked the completion of the
Nationalists’ propaganda broadcasting project during the Spanish Civil War:
namely, a unified radio voice against the multiple, diverse, radio stations of the
Republicans.8
After the Civil War in 1939, Franco had two main objectives: developing a
broadcasting structure able to host private enterprise while maintaining tight gov-
ernment control, and the popularisation of radio receivers: ‘may radio, as an






































instrument of the State, reach the remotest village’.9 The state was well aware of
the importance of the media, because ‘it had won battles’.10 However, there were
doubts regarding how it should be managed. This had two consecuences: first, only
RNE was authorised to broadcast news programmes, so it had a monopoly of radio
information11; second, the jurisidiction of radio services was constantly changing
from one Ministry to another during the 1940s and 1950s (Vice-secretariat of Pop-
ular Education, Ministry of National Education and Ministry of Information and
Tourism). Nevertheless, it was soon obvious that the lack of resources hampered
this plan, and the expansion of broadcasting was slow due to economic and social
difficulties. The number of receivers was roughly reckoned from the number of
licence fees paid. The drawbacks of this method were pointed out even by the for-
eign press:
Faith and faith alone must guide the radio time buyer in Spain, in as much as
the country hasn’t gotten around as yet to such things as radio surveys. The
Spaniard characteristically takes a rather jaundiced view of survey statistics of
any kind. He accepts albeit lightly, the Government’s estimate that there are
800.000 radio receiving sets in Spain. He may be allowed his scepticism (sic)
because of the manner in which the Government estimates that 50 per cent of
the Spaniards are dodging this tax. Last year 400.000 paid their radio taxes;
ergo there were 800.000 sets!12
The aim of this study is to analyse how Spanish public radio (RNE) became a fun-
damental engine of the creation and maintenance of Spain’s war efforts in its con-
tribution to the Second World War through the Blue Division. This is a topic that
has attracted little attention from scholars, and it has mostly been tackled only in
chapters or sections in broader studies.13
The Blue Division on the air: sources, bibliography and methodology
The abundance of literature on the Blue Division contrasts with the real impact this
unit had on the theatre of operations of the Second World War, suggesting a dis-
crepancy between the Division’s significance and the academic output which has
contributed to mythologising it.14 The myth was designed to create an exaggerated
and benign, even idyllic, reading of the members of the Division on the Russian
Front for two reasons.15 First, the Blue Division was Spain’s only significant contri-
bution to the twentieth century’s two world wars. Second, the high survival rate
among the Blue Division’s soldiers, and their generally high levels of education,
meant that a significant amount of information was disseminated in the form of
biographies, studies and memoirs, some of which went on to become the subject
of cinematic reconstruction.16 This trend towards mythologisation, which the cur-
rent historiography has tried to reframe along more realistic lines, has its origins in
the classic study by Kleinfeld and Tambs, which laid the foundations for a new
direction in research on the Blue Division.17
In order to explain the role played by RNE in the military intervention of the
Blue Division, we took current historiography as our starting point, since it pro-
vides a context which sheds light on the regime’s radio broadcasting initiatives.






































We selected a research method which used a wide number of primary sources of
various types. It must be noted that attempts to analyse radio messages from this
period meet many obstacles, the most significant of which is the (near) total
absence of recorded or transcribed written sources.18
This constraint was overcome through the use of other official sources (circu-
lars, correspondence and programmes which were approved by censors) found in
the Archivo General de la Administración (hereinafter, ‘AGA’). The AGA houses a
wide variety of documentation which provides an insight into official thinking and
the objectives which were set for RNE. We found references to remarks about the
Blue Division made by foreign broadcasters in the archives of the Spanish Foreign
Office, as well as in the Deutsches Rundfunkarchiv (German Radio Archive) in Frank-
furt am Main. References to the Blue Division found in these archives include
reports, transcripts and recordings. The reason behind the use of official sources is
to see the arguments presented in the preambles of the relevant laws as a self-justi-
fication exercise. From these, it is clear that the legal framework regarding the
media was based on interventionism and state control. Of course, it must be taken
into account that the mere enactment of a law does not necessarily entail that it
will be observed.
The study and analysis of published documentary sources was another focus of
this research, as was the national press (ABC and La Vanguardia). Additionally, the
magazine which served as a mouthpiece for the state broadcaster during this per-
iod, Radio Nacional de España (1941–1945), has been used to examine the most
official view of discourse on the Blue Division. In both cases, the documents serve
to focus our analysis, showing the changing impetus that Francoism tried to give to
the Blue Division during the war. This group of sources allow for the study of the
discourses presented in the media, which were the only points of view that Spa-
niards of that time were exposed to.
Somewhat paradoxically, we used written material, since it enabled us to pin-
point the tone of the discourse broadcast about the war by RNE during the Second
World War, as well as its activity on two fronts: both abroad (addressed to the
members of the Blue Division on the Russian front) and domestically (addressed to
the civilian population, those who would have to bear the cost of the war). The
study’s structure is based on the three main phases of the Blue Division’s activity.
The first stage covers the Division’s formation, from the recruitment period up to
the pledge of allegiance to the flag in Grafenwöhr at the end of June 1941; the
second stage runs from the Division’s entry into the war on the Russian front until
the gradual silencing of its activities which occurred as Spain sought to distance
itself from the Axis powers (and in particular, from the appointment of Francisco
Gómez Jordana as Minister of Foreign Affairs on 3 September 1942). In the final
stage, any issues related to the Blue Division were shrouded in silence. This silence
lasted beyond the end of the Second World War, until the arrival of the Semíramis,
which brought 286 Division members back to Spain in 1954. The conclusions show
that, for the regime, the Blue Division signified a new way of understanding radio,
in a different context to that of the Civil War and the early years of Francoism.






































State broadcasting’s new crusade: the Blue Division
Serrano Súñer’s forceful address in support of the German invasion – under the
slogan ‘Russia is guilty’ – marked the beginning of the campaign to create a
favourable climate for enlistment.19 Two days later, on 26 June, volunteer enrol-
ment lists were officially opened at the Falange’s headquarters. In the news sphere,
the deputy secretary for Popular Education, the agency that set the guidelines of
the governements censorship, set out the obligation to ‘publish, with special
prominence, any note that reflects the people’s desire to enlist for the Russian
front, including all of those details which may help give recruitment a nationwide
character’.20
Within just six days, 18,000 volunteers had come to enlist – more than 40
times the set number.21 It is hard to pinpoint the exact role played by state radio
in this context of patriotic exaltation because the campaign was supported by the
Spanish media as a whole. What is beyond doubt is that a medium like radio could
act in a more immediate way and bring the issue closer to the audience. Radio
Nacional magazine’s weekly summary of current affairs on radio offers a clue to
assessing RNE’s role in the campaign:
Listeners to our broadcasts have been able to form a clear idea of the progress
of operations on the Eastern front and of the victories of the German troops –
which, at the time of writing, have broken the Stalin line […]
[1 July, a note from Madrid] spoke about a highly topical issue: falangist volun-
teers from Madrid signing up to go and fight against Communism, describing
scenes which reveal the enthusiasm and style of our boys.22
In other words, there was broad consensus about the seemingly imminent military
defeat of the Soviet Union. Therefore, in keeping with orders, the triumphal
departure of the volunteers had to be well positioned and give them all the neces-
sary warmth, though it was forbidden to mention some ‘illustrious’ names who
accompanied that expedition.23
On 12 July 1941, the first two detachments of volunteers left Madrid. Of
course, Radio Nacional broadcasted the event along with impassioned speeches by
the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ramón Serrano Súñer, the Division’s General,
Agustín Muñoz Grandes and Miguel Primo de Rivera, brother of the founder of
Falange.24 In the pages of Radio Nacional magazine, the exaltation of the event was
described as one of the Spanish state radio broadcasting organisations’ finest
moments:
From the event, and the inexpressible emotion of the departure of the second
battalion of Madrilian falangist Blue Division volunteers to fight Soviet Com-
munism. Amid hymns, cheers and applause, our first speaker, Fernández de
Córdoba, could hardly make himself heard during the inspired and extremely
moving report he gave from the event. Its grandeur and emotional force made
it impossible to describe, and […] the Blue Division – we said into our micro-
phone- is like an ambassador of Spanish heroism and resolve, always ready for any
endeavours, and we are certain it will lift the name of Spain up high.25






































From that moment on, RNE would begin daily coverage of the vicissitudes faced
by the divisionaries. The chronicle began on the day the first expedition arrived at
Grafenwöhr for training. The head of Sección Femenina (a female auxiliary organi-
sation of Falange) in Berlin, Celia Giménez, was in charge of the radio bulletins.
The daily broadcasts to Spain took place each evening and their main objective was
to maintain the triumphant atmosphere that had preceded the division’s departure.
A brief note offers interesting clues as to how this was achieved:
In the news programmes from the Blue Division, we offer reports broadcast
by Radio Berlin in its extraordinary programmes at five thirty in the afternoon.
The interesting news provided in these reports, and the prominence of the
people who take their turn in front of the microphone at the camp where the
Blue Division is based, mean that this information is followed with great inter-
est by our listeners.26
There was a continuous supply of information in this period, with programmes
broadcasted in the night time slot every day, usually between ten and eleven
o’clock.27 Thus, the national radio station fulfilled its role of keeping the rearguard
– i.e. the domestic front – active, communicating, satisfying a growing demand
for information, as they so vehemently remark, ‘in all of our broadcasts, […] the
latest news about the Spanish volunteers, news which is listened to with the great-
est interest, as we know from the numerous letters we receive’.28
The propaganda effort was not limited to RNE, and in some cases foreign
radio stations– mostly German ones– were used to send messages to Spain, or to
counteract foreign propaganda. Shortly after his arrival in Grafenwöhr, Dionisio
Ridruejo, poet and former propaganda chief of Nationalist Spain, responded to ‘the
republican propaganda’ which was broadcast on the BBC with the assertion that
‘what is here is the best of the Falange’.29 He also wished to convey the divisionar-
ies’ euphoria: ‘All is happiness and enthusiasm in the camp. […] We feel sup-
ported by the affection and the camaraderie of the Spanish Falangists’. He was not
alone in his efforts. Also on Radio Berlin, Celia Giménez interviewed the volun-
teers, whether they were personalities such as Agustín Aznar, pilots from the Blue
Legion or lowly privates from the division.30 Volunteers sending greetings to their
relatives were always included.
In addition to the daily chronicles in the regular time slots, some special pro-
grammes were made about the Blue Division. The first of these, on 24 August
1941, was about the pledge of allegiance to the flag in Grafenwöhr, which had
taken place at the end of July that year. The beginning of this special programme
noted that
behind the Blue Division stands the whole of Spain, the Party, which through
the Falange is the representation of the New State, and the indelible memory
of a war in our country against the same enemy, in which our Caudillo was
the first Victorious General.31
Thus, the most popular slogans from the Civil War were reprised, from a time
when Franco had been heralded as the victorious leader of the first battle waged
against Communism in Europe.32






































Prior to the programme about the pledge to the flag, a feature by Jacinto
Miquelarena had been published in the ABC newspaper dated 1 August 1941, which
described the controversial phrasing of the oath.33 Neither Franco, nor his country
featured in the wording of the pledge, and an order prohibited the ‘dissemination
of the pledge taken by Blue Division volunteers in the German camp’.34 When
RNE broadcast the pledge, which had been recorded on disc by the Reich’s radio
service, it was described as a ‘brilliant event which made a lasting impression on
those who were present’, in which ‘the falangist volunteers swore by God, their
honour and Spain, to fight to the death against Communism’. In the original oath
they also swore loyalty to Adolf Hitler, but for the Radio Nacional broadcast
‘Spain’ was added to the pledge, while Hitler’s name was omitted. This manipula-
tion was done to avoid raise unnecessary tensions between the influential, non-
falangist Army officials.The official discourse identified all of the volunteers as
members of the Falange (in spite of the fact that a significant number of soldiers in
the Blue Division were not Falangists).35
RNE’s programmes added anecdotes which underlined national characteristics
in order to highlight the contribution the Spanish soldiers could make, such as their
winning attitude, vast degree of commitment and strong fighting spirit. For exam-
ple, one of the programmes told of how a peasant, who had got lost in Madrid on
the day of departure, had managed to get to Bavaria by his own means and rejoin
his companions. The programmes also provided information for relatives on how
to send correspondence to the divisionaries. Similarly, they featured a great deal of
hymns, military music, parades, etc.; even more than was usual for the time. The
report concluded with one final rally from Muñoz Grandes to the Spanish
people.36
Next, the Blue Division would transfer to the battlefront where it would see
military action. Until that point, the government radio station had taken an active
role in generating excitement about the war and had even contributed to the for-
mation of the Division. Furthermore, radio was defining itself as an emotionally
powerful medium thepolitical control of which was fundamental, as the practical
experiences in III Reich had proved.37 The period which followed was marked by
the main tragic consequences of the war – casualties – as well as difficulties of
broadcasting.
Radio Nacional de España’s second war: the Blue Division on the
Russian front
The Blue Division’s march from Grafenwöhr to their designated positions on the
Soviet front (between 20 August and 11 October 1941) hindered the broadcasts to
which the audience had become accustomed. Friends and relatives of the division-
aries began to receive less news just when they needed it most: in times of actual
combat. In the early stages, some information came through the German media,
but this soon proved insufficient as it was vague and lacked real content. From a
technical perspective, it was more difficult to broadcast regularly due to the condi-
tions of movement. Furthermore, military security prohibited the transmission of
‘any news story which refers to the position or movement of the units in which






































the Blue Division are embedded, as well as the actions of the same unless
previously authorised by the superior authority’.38
All of this posed serious problems. The strong demand for information could
not be met. The tone – patriotic, anti-communist and falangist – was repetitive
because the content could not be updated or satisfy the demand for swift and rele-
vant information about their loved ones that the audience called for.39 Some emer-
gency measures were taken to solve the problems. For example, recorded events
which had been broadcast already, such as the pledge to the flag, were repeated.
Among the few novelties that could be offered in the first few days of this stage,
in late August, was the broadcast of interviews with members of the Blue
Squadron (the Blue Division’s air force) which was still in Germany,40 and the dis-
patch of nurses from the Women’s Section of the Falange to the Division. That
event was treated as a second farewell.41 However, the fundamental shortage con-
tinued: there were no firsthand accounts as to what was happening to the Blue
Division, its position, status, etc., yet these were the things that were important
to the people closest to the volunteers on the eastern front. During the autumn of
1941, another solution involved broadcasting the numerous events that took place
in homage to the division. The broadcasts, like the events themselves, were loaded
with anti-Communist significance. This style of programme featured anti-
Communist speeches which had been pressed onto gramophone discs and were
then broadcast on radio stations in the Axis countries. Of course, Serrano Súñer’s
address was one of them.42
The uncertainty generated by the lack of information was exploited by British
intelligence. In Spain, they tried to act against Germany by taking advantage of the
interest falangist propaganda had stirred up about the Division. The British did this
mainly by using the same weapon: radio propaganda. Specifically, the programme
Azulejos, broadcast by the BBC in Spanish, reported irregularities in the recruitment
of divisionaries, such as the possible absorption of prisoners into the squadron. The
Franco regime’s public denials of this served to further spread the allegation among
the Spanish people. Later on, Azulejos toned its story down, and denied having sta-
ted that the entire Blue Division was made up of prisoners, but maintained that it
was true that there were some prisoners among the ranks.43
In this atmosphere of denials and confusion about the divisionaries’ voluntary
status, the first authorised news of the Division’s entry into combat was received.
The news arrived in Spain on 15 October 1941. Three days later, Spaniards found
out that the Blue Division was fighting in the northern sector of the front. The
treatment of news about the Blue Division’s entry into the war had also been con-
sidered by the censors, who warned that ‘newspapers shall not, under any pretext,
refer to the Blue Division’s entry into battle. Until such time as this office receives
new orders from the Deputy Secretary of Popular Education, the newspapers will
abstain completely from addressing this subject’.44
The first news of the Blue Division to arrive after the period of silence once
again created an atmosphere of euphoria among the Spanish population. This
euphoria was dampened by the news of the first casualties amid the Blue Division’s
ranks. From that moment on, there was a change in the official discourse. It now
stressed that ‘this price in blood was the unavoidable price of Spain’s victory over
Communism’.45 However, censorship could not avoid that news regarding a highly






































sensitive issue as casualties were broadcast. The account of a battle between Soviets
and Spaniards on 27 December 1941 provides an example. ‘It was four o’clock in
the afternoon when the battle ended. We had relatively few casualties. Barely 100
dead and wounded’.46 The news caused concern among relatives and friends. The
need for more concrete details – such as who the dead and injured were– became
clear. This account was selected for study as it caused great ‘anxiety among the
families of the courageous companions who fight in the Blue Division’. This type
of incident prompted new directives
that the most exquisite care should be taken in the broadcasting of news, of
whatever type and origin, which might cause the slightest concern for the fam-
ilies of our fellow soldiers in our heroic Blue Division, who are fighting on the
Eastern front to crush Communism.47
This set of circumstances created two more battlefronts for the regime; the mobili-
sation of the rearguard to fund the war effort, and the scheduling of special pro-
grammes to keep morale high, both on the domestic front and overseas. State
radio was to spearhead this propaganda effort.
RNE as a mobilising force on the home front
Mobilisation of the home front began at Christmas 1941. The Blue Division’s
‘Christmas box’ was an important collective display of support orchestrated by the
regime and falangist propaganda. This campaign, initially scheduled to run until 19
November 1941, actually lasted until the end of the year and beyond, with some
late contributions made in January 1942.48 The basic means of collaboration
required the work and effort of all Spaniards and radio took an active role in the
broadcast of this kind of message:
The appeals made by the Women’s Section, asking all women in Spain to
dedicate the greatest possible amount of time to making warm garments for
the heroic volunteers of the Blue Division, have been broadcast on various
programmes, as a filler.49
Another form of collaboration was through monetary donations. Radio Nacional
‘rewarded’ these initiatives through a relationship with the individuals and organisa-
tions who contributed in this way. A list was made of ‘donations collected in the
Blue Division offices, with the intention of supporting the Spanish volunteers who
have gone to Russia to fight against Communism’.50 The RNE programmes tried
to spur on those regions which were least receptive to the campaign. Barcelona
was one example, and a warning was sent of the danger of ‘suffering the shame of
falling too far behind’ in this meaningful contest.51 It stood out as the exception in
‘an example of magnificent perseverance, (since) all the Spanish provinces kept up
an admirable fight to help Christmas presents reach the sector of the Eastern front
occupied by our men’.52
Once Christmas was over, the regime sought to maintain the civilian popula-
tion’s interest in the Blue Division. Any reason would do, from a special tribute
on the anniversary of the volunteers’ departure for the USSR, to warnings of the






































impending Russian winter, broadcast during the summer months.53 The campaign
was kept up until late 1942, when in light of the coming Christmas season, Radio
Nacional asked that ‘all of Spain make a contribution so that the heroic combatants
of the Blue Division can enjoy a splendid Christmas box’.54
RNE and combatants’ morale: the special programmes
Despite the important role played by state radio in this type of events, the special
programmes dedicated to the Blue Division were RNE’s true frontline. The pro-
grammes came in response to two factors: firstly, the broadcaster wanted to avoid
the problems which silence and lack of information about the Blue Division had
caused in July and August of 1941. Secondly, it aimed to revive the Spanish
public’s mood after the news of the first setbacks (and deaths in combat) of the
Spanish expeditionaries.
Following this logic, the first special programme for the Blue Division was
made, and broadcast on 8 December 1941. The aim was ‘to allow news about the
soldiers who, in the faraway frontier lands of the East, on the edge of Europe,
stand guard against Russian barbarism, to reach all the relatives of the Blue Divi-
sion and all Spaniards’. Therefore, the objective was to bolster both fronts, build-
ing bridges ‘between our Blue Division companions and the constant memory of
their loved ones […] Radio Nacional will be their voice and the messenger
between them’.55
This two-part programme went out in the after-lunch timeslot. The first part
was entitled ‘Newspaper on the wind’ and featured the participation of literary
figures of the day, followed by some lines from José Luis Arrese about ‘the Army
and the Falange’ and a speech by Girón, the minister for Labour, entitled ‘Deliber-
ate Liars’.56 Despite its title (‘Current affairs in the spotlight’), the second part
also had a literary component. The programme’s conclusion was under the direc-
tion of the National Delegation of the Youth Front’s cultural advisor, who read a
speech to the Blue Division soldiers. We cannot know with any certainty what
kind of reception this first programme of homage to the Blue Division got, though
there are two pieces of evidence which suggest relative disappointment. Firstly, in
the province of Alicante, the comment was made that the ‘programme got a cold
reception from the public because of its excessively official nature and lack of
humanity’.57 The second indication is that, days later, a new RNE director was
appointed, with Ismael Herraiz replacing José Rodiles Pascual.58
The new director brought the organisation of new programmes about the Blue
Division under his direct control. On 28 December 1941, he began by recording
them in the presence of a live audience, to break away from the rigidity of official
discourse and give them greater emotional charge.59 Keeping the morale of the
combatants and the civilian population high depended on the success of the pro-
grammes. Ismael Herraiz issued the following assessment to the National Delega-
tion of Propaganda after ‘RNE’s extraordinary programme Cara al público’60:
In spite of all the flaws that you were able to observe, yesterday’s programme
was a resounding success in terms of the profound and authentic humanity






































which we were able to achieve. We moved masses of Spaniards, who had pre-
viously found all of the distortions of propaganda intolerable, to tears. I believe
that all of the ‘dilettantism’ which went before us in the manipulation of the
tools of radio broadcasting and propaganda did not achieve as much as we have
in just one programme.61
Herraiz’s assessment of almost ‘reinventing propaganda’ was not a total exaggera-
tion, and it gives us an idea of the role that the RNE director wanted to bestow
on radio in this context. Days later, Torres López, in his role as representative of
the National Delegation of Propaganda, acknowledged this work, noting: ‘I con-
sider the programme Cara al público, broadcast to the Blue Division, to be a prime
example of the return that can be obtained from the service that you run’.62
Ismael Herraiz’s report to the National Delegation of Propaganda sheds light
on the functions of radio in general, and of these programmes in particular. Her-
raiz was getting closer to the ‘magic formula’ so often sought by the Franco
regime for its radio programmes. He tried to convey these ideas in reports
explaining how programmes should be made:
It is possible that there will be a good deal of criticism of the musical part of
the show, which some might say featured an excess of Cuban music and dance.
Firstly, I must state on record that personally, I am completely in favour of
using this type of orchestra. We are addressing soldiers, and many of them
know the names of these orchestras from records, the radio, public places,
etc.
[…]
I think that a programme dedicated to soldiers should have an informal and
youthful tone, avoiding excessive use of familiar stories, even if they please the
audience, like Fernández de Córdoba’s tale about his poor mother who he had the
misfortune to lose when he was very young.63
The aim was, therefore, to put an end to programmes which featured a grandilo-
quent tone, official propaganda and music for the ‘elite’, opting instead for a more
human and emotional form of radio broadcasting. This emotion was further intensi-
fied by the men of the regime themselves. For example, radio presenter Thomas
de Carranza declared that ‘there was not one single person in the theatre who was
not in tears; not one artist, not one musician, not one worker among those of us
who were in the wings’.64
The most moving part of the programmes was the exchange of greetings and
news between members of a family (usually between mothers and their sons), sep-
arated by distances of thousands of kilometres, highlighting the feeling of nostalgia
for the ‘beloved homeland’. The programme’s effect reached beyond the atmo-
sphere that was created in the theatre and among those who listened to it. The
whole performance was recorded onto discs that were sent to the divisionaries on
the Soviet front:
The recording of the discs that I listened to from beginning to end yesterday,
which were sent to Berlin on the same night, was perfect: the voices of the
volunteers’ mothers, the background of applause and cheers and the overall






































development of the programme were reproduced with absolute clarity and I
think our companions in the Blue Division will feel as if they were in the audi-
ence at yesterday’s gala.65
There was a perception that, in just a short period, the fundamental objectives of
keeping morale and fighting spirit high, both among divisionaries and all Spaniards,
had been achieved. This sense of euphoria marked a turning point as officials were
reminded of radio’s potential for achieving propaganda aims: ‘when radio is put to
the service of the only everlasting values that are worth taking into consideration,
the technique loses its cold, soulless affectation to become one of the most sincere
vehicles of the human heart’.66 This perception was also reflected in a series of in-
depth articles published by Radio Nacional on the subject of radio as a weapon of
war, which demonstrate the level of consideration the authorities gave to the pro-
pagandistic potential of radio, even in peace-time.67
This approach was applied to another programme in RNE’s Cara al público ser-
ies, broadcast on Sunday, 22 February 1942, from the Teatro Español.68 It fol-
lowed similar lines to the previous programme with a slot from 10 pm to
10.15 pm in which a group of mothers addressed their sons. In the grandiloquent
rhetoric typical of the time, it recognised the importance of ‘hearing the emotion
in the accent of a mother who is speaking directly to her son, and though she can-
not see him, knowing that her words will reach straight to his heart. The wonders
of modern techniques at the service of element of emotional propaganda, and it
was beneficial to use them’. Thus, radio’s importance in acting like an umbilical
cord between the men on the frontlines and the homefront was established: ‘At
the end of the transmissions to Europe, five mothers of Blue Division volunteers
send a greeting over the microphones, and messages from volunteers’ relatives are
also broadcast’.69
According to official propaganda, ‘the moment when the mothers addressed
those heroic sons of theirs, sons of our Spain, to send them their greetings and
news, their eyes filled with tears, was deeply moving’.70 From 15 March 1942
onwards, the most popular aspects of these Cara al público programmes were
exploited to excess, being broadcast daily.71 Behind this triumphalism, some
important doses of reality were left out. For example, recruiting for the next Blue
Division became more difficult from the beginning of 1942 onwards. The heroic
proclamations which were broadcast on the radio and other media were sufficiently
encouraging to persuade people to venture out to the USSR.72 Measures were
taken to stimulate enlistment and the propaganda from the state controlled media
outlets was further bolstered, resulting in the draft’s departure for Russian terri-
tory on 4 March 1942.
The last of these special Cara al público programmes took place on 3 May 1942
and was put together on the occasion of Celia Giménez’s arrival in Spain, who,
after 2 years as liaison in Berlin, had become quite known as the ‘godmother of
the Blue Division’.73 This third programme had more or less the same contents as
the others, and was regarded by Ismael Herraiz as a brilliant success.74 This third
programme followed the same lines as the previous ones and was also described as
a resounding success by Ismael Herraiz.75 The programme marked the end of a
phase which could almost be described as experimental, whereby Herraiz’s






































methods were put into practice in a series of special programmes, made in a short
period of time with meagre resources, and which were not initially planned to
have a long run. Once the success of these methods had been demonstrated and
the suspicions of the official institutions overcome, the Cara al público programmes
would be broadcast regularly.
From the return of the heroes to 10 years of silence
Days after the third Cara al público broadcast, the heroes of the Blue Division
returned. Naturally, Radio Nacional took to its microphones to provide an account
of their return.76 Over several months, reports about ‘our heroic volunteers’ were
broadcast, continuing to hide the difficulties at home and abroad. However, com-
munication policy was becoming ambivalent: the special programmes had given
way to regular broadcasts for the divisionaries, yet official silences began to get
longer. It is important to note that there is a lack of documentation from this per-
iod about major programmes on the Blue Division. The sudden silence is all the
more significant, given the intense coverage the division had previously received.
This change in mood had also been perceived on the home front, and sectors
of the Falange attempted to compensate for it. In August 1942, the Women’s sec-
tion put together a team of 200 female Falangists to act as war godmothers, which
involved exchanging letters with one or two soldiers each to keep moral high and
show them that, ‘although Spain’s political evolution was perceptible, the women
had not forgot’.77 They collected Christmas boxes for the soldiers again that year,
but this time with much less institutional support.
In short, it was becoming increasingly clear that the Blue Division was an
increasingly uncomfortable subject for the regime. Between mid-1942 and the end
of 1943, the international situation had undergone significant changes. The tri-
umphalist euphoria, prevalent when victory for the Axis powers seemed certain,
turned to disappointment in the face of the Germans’ obvious defeat in Soviet ter-
ritory. The war was far from over, but the final outcome was becoming more and
more evident. The volunteers of the Soviet Front were living proof of Spain’s
involvement with Nazi Germany, which it suited the regime to ignore.
Finally, a note from a RNE broadcaster in La Coruña ( found in its almanac)
endorsed the relegation of programmes for the Division to the early morning
timeslot. Later, an official order was given to terminate not just the regular pro-
grammes, but also any reference to the Blue Division whatsoever on RNE from
November 1943 onwards:
Programmes dedicated to the Blue Division were monitored directly –
especially the direct message service, which was broadcast at 22h15, immedi-
ately after the Radio Nacional service, until the month of June. At that time,
on the advice of the volunteers themselves, it was broadcast at 0h55 when the
reception in Russia is much better. These programmes were suspended last
month according to orders from the highest authority.78
The silence would last for 10 years. The epilogue to the story of the Blue Division
would come on 2 April 1954, with RNE’s broadcast of the arrival of the Semíramis






































into port in Barcelona. The Turkish boat, chartered by the Red Cross, had
departed from the Black Sea with 286 Spanish repatriates from the USSR on board,
with ex-combatants from the Blue Division and ‘children of the war’ among them.
From 31 March onwards, Juan Manuel Soriano and Federico Gallo presented a
special programme which mainly consisted of the broadcast of hundreds of people’s
heartfelt greetings to their relatives on the Semíramis, which they listened to via an
on-board receiver.
This report gained particular magnitude, not only because of its extraordinary
length, (with several breaks, the programme ran from the afternoon of 31 March
to the night of 2 April), but also because it coincided with a period of great falan-
gist ‘euphoria’, presided over by Jesús Suevos in the General Bureau for Radio
Broadcasting.79 This landmark event was so important in the collective memory
that it was used as the climax of the most notable film about the return of the
divisionaries, Ambassadors in Hell.80
A historical perspective on this example of Spanish participation in the Second
World War was espoused by RNE’s Barcelona bureau. Each Wednesday from
October 1954 onwards, it broadcast a series called Division 250, which was based
on the novel by writer and Blue Division soldier Tomas Salvador, and adapted by
María del Carmen García Lecha. Ten years on, it marked the end of one of the
Franco regime’s great radio broadcasting and military accomplishments.
Conclusions on state radio broadcasting and the Blue Division
In strictly military terms, the Blue Division was of scant significance. Nevertheless,
it did acquire crucial importance in the Spanish political framework, in that it was
a symbol which transcended the ‘neutrality versus belligerence’ debate and came
to reflect the internal divisions of the fledgling regime. This made it unique in both
the news context and the political context of Francoism. As we have seen, radio
propaganda about the Blue Division went through two basic stages before the per-
iod of silence noted above. The first stage, heroic exaltation, was followed by the
need to mobilise the population on the home front in the face of the initial nega-
tive reports. In the process, the way the Franco regime made radio programmes
also underwent a transformation: from grandiloquent and rhetorical in tone, with a
top-down approach, to persuasion through the use of popular culture and senti-
mentality. In making propaganda for the Blue Division, Francoist radio rediscov-
ered its capacity to mobilise, which had been lost since the Civil War.
In this line of thought, Francoism envisioned public broadcasting as a way of
conveying principles and ideology and ensuring control of information. Because of
this, the Blue Division was a highly sensitive topic that worked very well with a
broader programming approach, aimed at engineering a consensus between the
Spanish people and the acceptance of the dictatorship. Spanish society was specially
open to these kinds of messages due to the context of poverty and lack of
horizons. The problem, therefore, was how to formulate such messages in an
appropriate way.
Ismael Herraiz’s appointment in December 1941 was a fundamental turning
point for the radio. The implementation of his policies was rewarded with






































immediate success. That success was largely due to three key innovations: the
change to programmes made in front of an audience, popular music that might
genuinely have been of interest to a soldier in the Division, and most importantly,
the use of the combatants’ mothers. The regime emphasised that ‘several Spanish
mothers, chosen from the thousands who pray and dream about their heroic sons
who are fighting on the Russian front, had the opportunity to address them
directly’.81 This success in connecting with popular feeling was cut short, however,
by the swift end to the programmes of homage to the Blue Division.
The motives for championing the Blue Division had as much to do with
domestic as with foreign policy, but the ultimate aim was to take part in the Axis
powers’ victory, and to treat the volunteers as an advance party for Spain’s poten-
tial intervention in the war if the Germans managed to defeat the Soviet Union, or
to settle Spain’s moral debt if they did not.82 Defeat in the battle of Stalingrad
(between August 1942 and February 1943) changed the international situation radi-
cally. Those who had appeared to be the sure victors were, in fact, vanquished,
and the Spanish – Falangist – contribution to the defeat of international Commu-
nism turned into a fiasco which neither the government, nor its radio station, was
willing to accept.
However, the Blue Division had become an uncomfortable subject for the
regime long before that. The arduousness of the war on the eastern front meant
that the supply of volunteers began to dwindle, and the returning soldiers started
to become a political nuisance. Dionisio Ridruejo, whose enlistment in the Division
had been given a prominent place in the regime’s propaganda, returned to Spain
disillusioned, and criticised Franco severely. In May, Ridruejo had a meeting with
Franco in which he voiced his concerns, but the split became irreparable when
Ridruejo sent a letter in which he expressed his desire to distance himself from
Francoism completely.83 In June of the same year, Franco had ordered General
Muñoz Grandes’ replacement because of the excessive esteem in which Muñoz was
held by the Germans, who, it was rumoured, wanted to make him head of the
government in order to guarantee Spain’s participation in the war.84
The change of Minister of Foreign Affairs in September 1942, from
Germanophile Serrano Súñer to the pro-allies Count of Jordana, only helped pre-
cipitate the dissolution of the Blue Division, largely as a gesture towards the
Anglo-American allies (whose armies were at that time just on the other side of
the Gibraltar strait) and ward off their threats to block imports into Spain.
The media silence surrounding the Blue Division, which had become politically
awkward both at home and abroad, would extend beyond the Second World War,
to the toughest moments of diplomatic isolation for the regime. The Blue Divi-
sion’s return to RNE’s airwaves coincided with the return of prisoners of war
aboard the Semíramis in 1954. More importantly, it coincided with Spain’s twofold
return to the diplomatic stage, via the Concordat with the Catholic Church and
the [Pact of Madrid] agreements with the United States in 1953. These agreements
in particular signified Spain’s unofficial admission into the American defence frame-
work, against the backdrop of the Cold War. Franco had contrived that his
regime’s anti-communist stance carried more weight than its earlier support for
the Axis powers. Although the return of the Blue Division myth to the airwaves
overlapped with the publication of the majority of the books written by surviving






































soldiers, this did not come about purely by chance. The regime exploited the
adventures of the Spanish volunteers whenever it was politically expedient, in
order to highlight its decades-long struggle against Communism.
So the memory of the Blue Division was a good tool for changing Franco’s
portrayal, from a fascist dictator to an anti-communist, unyielding leader and Wes-
tern ally. Moreover, after the hard years of isolation and poverty, the Blue Divi-
sion could be presented in the domestic sphere as proving that the regime had
always been right in its decisions, and that all the suffering had a cause. The rest
of the world only then, years after the war, recognised Spain’s fight against Com-
munism. The weight of propaganda discourse had already drifted from the Falange
to Franco himself, ‘the first general in the world that had defeated Communism on
the battlefield’, as the slogan said. In sum, by exalting some features of the Blue
Division – its anti-communism – and conveniently forgetting others – its closeness
to the Nazis – the volunteers became, even after their defeat, a diplomatic tool to
ensure the survival of the dictatorship.
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